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Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America
Auteur
Éditeur Cambridge University Press
Année 2017
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Auteur
Titre
Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America
Éditeur
Description
1 vol. (XII-380 p.) : ill. ; 23 cm
Collection
Notes
Bibliogr. p. 342-367. Index
Sujets
Classification Dewey
361.6/5098
Contenu
1. An electoral theory of forbearance ; 2. Who votes for forbearance ; 3. What enables forbearance: inadequate social policy and squatting ; 4. When politicians choose forbearance: core constituencies and street vending ; 5. Where forbearance occurs: the role of electoral institutions ; 6. Why forbearance continues: path dependencies in the informal welfare state ; 7. How forbearance ends: lessons from Turkey
Résumé
Présentation de l'éditeur : "Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows."
ISBN
978-1-107-17407-8
1-107-17407-4
978-1-316-62635-1
1-316-62635-0
Origine de la notice
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