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Strategic party government : why winning trumps ideology
Auteur
Éditeur The University of Chicago Press
Année copyright 2017
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Auteur
Titre
Strategic party government : why winning trumps ideology
Éditeur
Description
1 vol. (X-222 pages) ; 23 cm
Collection
Notes
Bibliogr. p. 197-220. Index
Sujets
Classification Dewey
328.73/0769
Contenu
Worst.congress.ever.why? ; A theory of strategic parties ; Microlevel foundations: do citizens dislike partisanship or extremism? / (coauthored with Everett Young) ; The electoral costs of party loyalty in Congress / (coauthored with Jamie Carson and Ellen Key) ; The effects of legislative behavior on aggregate election outcomes ; The dynamics of partisan power ; Party competition in legislative voting
Résumé
"Why is Congress mired in partisan polarization? The conventional answer is that members of Congress and their constituencies fundamentally disagree with one other along ideological lines. But Gregory Koger and Matthew J. Lebo uncover a more compelling reason that today's political leaders devote so much time to conveying their party's positions, even at the expense of basic government functions: Both parties want to win elections. In Strategic Party Government, Koger and Lebo argue that Congress is now primarily a forum for partisan competition. In order to avoid losing, legislators unite behind strong party leaders, even when they do not fully agree with the policies their party is advocating. They do so in the belief that party leaders and voters will reward them for winning or at least trying to win these legislative contests. And as the parties present increasingly united fronts, partisan competition intensifies and pressure continues to mount for a strong party-building strategy despite considerable disagreement within the parties" (ed.)
ISBN
978-0-226-42457-6
0-226-42457-X
978-0-226-42460-6
0-226-42460-X
Origine de la notice
Abes (SUDOC)
 

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